American Military Leadership: "Old Hickory" or "Fuss and Feathers"?

What is a Professional?

Professionalism

Professional attributes include the following: The occupation

1. is a full-time and stable job, serving continuing societal needs;
2. is regarded as a lifelong calling by the practitioners, who identify themselves personally with their job subculture;
3. is organized to control performance standards and recruitment;
4. requires formal, theoretical education;
5. has a service orientation in which loyalty to standards of competence and loyalty to clients' needs are paramount;
6. is granted a great deal of collective autonomy by the society it serves, presumably because the practitioners have proven their high ethical standards and trustworthiness.

[Allan R. Millett, Military Professionalism and Officership in America (Columbus, Ohio, 1977), 2.

General James Wilkinson and the Early National Armies

- Little professional education
- No standards of entry or promotion
- In and out of service
- Did not see himself solely as a member of the officer corps
- Often politically appointed
- Little self-identity with the nation


General James Wilkinson

"The Thirty Years' Peace"

1815-1845

- **Calhoun** Reforms (1817-25)
  - John C. Calhoun, SecWar, idea of using Regulars as a cadre (Expansible Army)
  - Continues to build coastal forts
  - Enlarges Regular army
  - Establishes Army staff (ordinance, QM, etc.)
- West Point reforms under **Thayer** (1817-32)
  - USMA as preeminent engineering school in America
- **Scott** Reforms
  - Military Laws
  - Regulations
  - Tactics





Agents of Reform:

John C. Calhoun
Secretary of War, 1817-1825

Reforms

- **Commanding General**
- **Bureau/Staff system**
- **Engineer Board Strategy**
- **Civil Works**
- **"Expansible Army"**

Creating a Purpose for the Regular Army

The Engineer Board Strategy of 1821:
How to Defend a Continental Nation



“Expansible Army” Concept



- 1821: Congress plans to cut the army
- Calhoun developed a plan in coordination with his generals
- Army to be small in peacetime
- Cadre top-heavy with officers & NCOs
- Capable of rapid wartime expansion
- Demands an officer corps dedicated to planning for war
- Congress disapproved, but the concept endured

“at the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or create”

Agents of Reform:

Sylvanus Thayer
Superintendent, USMA, 1817-1833

Reforms

- **Four-year program**
- **Thayer method**
- **Regular examinations**
- **Engineering curriculum**
- **Order of merit**
- **Disciplinary system**
- **Office of Commandant**
- **Academic Board**
- **Board of Visitors**

Educator of a New Profession

Agents of Reform:



Major General Winfield Scott

- Hero at Queenston Heights, Chippewa, and Lundy's Lane
- First military observer mission
- Compendium of military laws
- Wrote Army regulations
- Scott's Tactics
- Commanding General, 1841-1861
- Suffered from foot-in-mouth disease

Role Model to a New Generation of Officers

New Conceptualization of Officer Profession, 1815-1861

- now lifelong commitment
- educational system
- social system – shape their craft

  -apolitical

  -truly national

  -anti-amateur

Antebellum Army – Operations other than War

- Clearing Indians/security
- Exploration/mapmaking
- Internal improvements
- Enforcing trade regulations

What does the U.S. Army bring to the table in order to accomplish these missions?


Trail of Tears



War with Mexico…
Why?



War with Mexico



Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna
(1794-1876)

Causes:

- Manifest Destiny – U.S. wants the West for expansion and settlement.
- Mexican Government untidy – lots of revolutions and govt. changes in Mexico between 1830-1844.
- American citizens living in Mexico treated badly by government, usually when the Americans plan revolutions and stuff.
- Mexico owes U.S. a lot of money, and due to political instability, not likely to pay it off.
- Dispute between Mexico and the U.S. over boundaries of Texas.
- In 1844, Democrats make expansion a key plank in their presidential election platform.


James K. Polk

Polk elected in 1844. He hoped that he could acquire Mexican territories in the West through diplomacy. Mexico severed diplomatic ties with the U.S., so Polk decided to go to war.

He wanted the Mexicans to start the war, so that an outraged U.S. public would demand war. But the Mexicans refused to cooperate.

Just as Polk was about to ask for war anyway, Mexican and U.S. troops fought a skirmish on the Rio Grande River. Polk blamed Mexico. Got his war.



Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna
(1794-1876)

War with Mexico

Mexico also had sufficient grievances to want a war with the U.S.

They believed that they could win the war because:

- War would be unpopular in the Northeastern U.S.
- Great Britain Might ally with Mexico in the war.
- Santa Anna was the greatest general in the world – he liked to call himself the Napoleon of the Western Hemisphere.

Mexican hopes were unfounded. Mexico lacked the military power to defend even its home territory, much less an empire.



Who was at fault?

Americans said that the Mexicans shot first, and had crossed the Rio Grande to attack U.S. troops.

Mexicans said Americans had attacked them across the river, and were the aggressors.

Whig Congressman, Abraham Lincoln asked where the first spot of American blood fell in the skirmish. If on Mexican soil then the war was unjust. His question called the “Spot Resolution.”

Lincoln’s constituents showed their appreciation by not re-electing him.

Ready for War???
Problems?

- Endstate?
- Regulars vs. Volunteers?
- Presidential Control
- Political Officers
- Logistics
- Anti-War Sentiment



President James K. Polk

Strategy??? Make a plan.

Mexican War Highlights

American volunteers in Upper California rebelled against Mexico and established the Bear Flag Republic.

Under Capt. John Frémont, Bear Flaggers begin attacks against lower California and northern New Mexico.

Frémont took volunteers and regular army into New Mexico where he met up with U.S. troops under S.W. Kearny who had advanced from Missouri.

Zachary Taylor Won victories along the Rio Grande, took Monterrey, Mexico and inflicts a major defeat on Santa Anna at Buena Vista.

Winfield Scott landed at Vera Cruz. After a series of battles across Mexico, Scott enters Mexico City on September 14, 1847. Mexico Surrenders.

Mexican War – North (Taylor)

- 2 small battles at Palo Alto and Resaca de Palma before war declared
- captured town of Monterrey (street fighting) – halted for armistice
- underestimated Mexican pride

  Santa Anna moves North
- Battle of Buena Vista

  (Col Jeff Davis “saves” US position)
- Santa Anna withdrew to meet new invasion
- Taylor held firm – waiting for reinforcements, stalemate



Mexican War – West (Kearney/Stockton)

- John Fremont (secret order) join US settlers in revolt vs Mex auth – Bear Flag Rep
- small US force able to exploit scattered/poor led Mexican troops, secure CA
- Stephen Kearney Army of the West (2000 vol) move on Santa Fe after war declared
- quickly captures NM unopposed, moves on to Southern Cal
- Mexicans mount stiff resistance at Los Ang/San Diego but Kearney reinforcements win in 1847
- President Polk now claimed no peace treaty from Mexican accept w/o yielding CA to US

Mexican War – South (Scott)

- Gen Scott slowly opens new theater March 1847, break stalemate in North
- Decisive campaign in South,

  amphib landing at Vera Cruz, captured in 2 weeks
- march west to Mexico City

  little resistance as Mexicans draw them inland away from supplies
- Cerro Gordo—engineers save the day (Lee story)
- Puebla (50 mi) – 3000 sick b/c of local water

Mexican War – South (Scott)

- Mexicans retreat to halt advance on city – Contreras and Churubusco
- Mexicans take 8000 casualties to US 1000
- Scott could have taken city but pauses for armistice – gave Santa Anna time to build defenses
- final battle at fortified hill of Chapaultepec – US artillery – TJ Jackson, Longstreet
- following infantry assault bloody but soon captured city on 14 Sept


OREGON TERRITORY
WIS.
IOWA
UNORGANIZED TERRITORY
ILLINOIS
Fort Leavenworth
MISSOURI
Missouri R.
UNITED STATES
KY.
TENN.
ARKANSAS
Arkansas R.
Red R.
Mississippi R.
LA.
MISS.
TEXAS
Disputed Area
Sonoma (Bear Flag Revolt) June 14, 1846
Frémont
San Francisco occupied July 10, 1846
Monterey occupied July 7, 1846
Los Angeles
San Gabriel Jan. 8, 1847
San Pasqual Dec. 6, 1846
San Diego
Kearny
Colorado R.
Santa Fe occupied Aug. 18, 1846
U.S. Navy
PACIFIC OCEAN
MEXICO
Chihuahua
Rio Grande
Nueces R.
New Orleans
Scott
Corpus Christi
Taylor
Gulf of Mexico
Palo Alto May 8, 1846
Matamoros
Resaca de la Palma May 9, 1846
Buena Vista Feb. 22–23, 1847
Monterrey Sept. 21–24, 1846
Santa Anna
Tampico occupied Nov. 14, 1846
Cerro Gordo April 18, 1847
Veracruz occupied March 29, 1847
Mexico City Sept. 13–14, 1847
U.S. forces
Mexican forces
U.S. victory
Mexican victory
Boundary of territory ceded by Mexico, 1848
0 200 400 miles
0 200 400 kilometers

So what did we get?



Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo gives the U.S., California, Nevada, Utah, most of Arizona and area of New Mexico not claimed already by Texas. U.S. gives Mexico $15 million and pays Mexico's outstanding debts to U.S. creditors.

The Army in the Mexican War



Lieutenant Sam Grant



Captain R. E. Lee

"I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the War between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share."

-General Winfield Scott

Lessons Learned in Mexico for West Point Grads

- Flanking Maneuvers
- Training/Discipline
- Logistics
- Engineering
- Artillery

- For the home front, the war affirmed a romantic view of armed conflict.









American Military Thought, 1815-1860



Professor Dennis Hart Mahan

Jomini



General Henry W. Halleck

Jomini's Major Concepts

- Concentration
- Interior Lines
- Unity of Command
- Offense
- Decisive Point
- Surprise
- Levels of War
- Annihilation
- Logistics (lines of operations)
- Timeless Principles

If you want to know the secret of my success against the prissy Prussians then this is the book for you. **N**

50 MILLION

NAPOLEON FOR DUMMIES®

Interior Lines
Exterior Lines
It's All Here!

A Reference for the Rest of Us!

by Jomini



The complete guide for defeating your enemies.

Whether you are a novice or pro this book will make you unbeatable.

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Democracy, Nationalism, and Expansion



The Battlefield—Tactics, Technology, and Organization

Small Arms

Enfield Rifled Musket—Minie Projectiles and Cartridge



Model 1842 Smoothbore Musket—Buck and Ball Projectiles and Cartridge

Bayonet

Rifled vs. Smoothbore

TYPICAL CIVIL WAR SMALL ARMS

Weapon	*Effective Range (in yards)*	*Theoretical Rate of Fire (in rounds/minute)*
U.S. rifled musket, muzzle-loaded, .58-caliber	400-600	3
English Enfield rifled musket, muzzle-loaded, .577-caliber	400-600	3
Smoothbore musket, muzzle-loaded, .69-caliber	100-200	3

Deployment



Theoretically there were around 100 men in each of 10 companies—around 1000 men. In reality, there were usually much less.

Flags played a key role in the regiment.



Note the smoke and lines of men.



A skirmisher

Why did they fight in lines? Were they stupid?

Maximum firepower to the front

This line has been “flanked.”

Soon it will “break” and run away!









TYPICAL CIVIL WAR FIELD ARTILLERY

Weapon	Tube Composition	Tube Length (in inches)	Effective Range at 5 Elevation (in yards)
6-pdr smoothbore field gun 3.67 in. dia. bore	bronze	60	1,523
12-pdr smoothbore field howitzer 4.62 in. dia. bore	bronze	59	1,680
12-pdr smoothbore mountain howitzer 4.62 in. dia. bore	bronze	33	1,005
10-pdr Parrott rifle 2.9 in. dia. bore	iron	78	1,950
3-inch ordnance rifle 3.0 in. dia. bore	iron	73	1,835
12-pdr James rifle 3.67 in. dia. bore	bronze	69	1,700

Artillery

Firing the Gun





National Archives

Federal gun crew drilling with a 20-pounder Parrott field rifle.

Artillery Projectiles

Shot

Bolt



"Fixed" round of solid-shot amunition

Spherical shell

Rifled shell



Canister



Spherical case shot



Rifled case shot

Contents of a fired 12-pounder canister — 27 1.5" iron balls with plates.





The Effectiveness of Different Types of Artillery Fire – The Theory



4 Gun battery at regulation spacing. Guns could be deployed much closer than shown if necessary. Horse teams may be unhitched and moved into cover for long engagements.



TABLE OF FIRE

20-PDR. PARROTT GUN

Charge, 2 lbs. of Mortar Powder

ELEVATION In Degrees	PROJECTILE	RANGE In Yards	TIME OF FLIGHT In Seconds
1	Case Shot, 19½ lbs.	620	1⅞
2	Case Shot, 19½ lbs.	950	3⅛
3⅝	Shell, 18¾ lbs.	1500	4¾
5	Shell, 18¾ lbs.	2100	6½
10	Shell, 18¾ lbs.	3350	11¼
15	Shell, 18¾ lbs.	4400	17¼

CARE OF AMMUNITION CHEST

1st. Keep everything out that does not belong in them, except a bunch of cord or wire for breakage; beware of loose tacks, nails, bolts, or scraps.
2nd. Keep friction primers in their papers, tied up. The pouch containing those for instant service must be closed, and so placed as to be secure. Take every precaution that primers do not get loose; a single one may cause an explosion. Use plenty of tow in packing.

(This sheet is to be glued to the inside of Limber Chest Cover.)

The effectiveness of gunfire (the standard combat load was 40-60 rounds)

Churibusco (Mexican War)	**1 per 125 shots**
Murfreesboro	**1 per 145 shots**
Gaines Mill	**1 per 100 shots**
Wilderness	**1 per 100 shots**

Overall battle casualty rates (remember that most Civil War soldiers died of disease)

Army of the Potomac May-July, 1864 (estimates of Medical Director A of P)

Shell	**2112**
Solid Shot	**88**
Bullet	**25,454 probably includes canister and shrapnel**
Bayonet	**38**
Sword	**5**

Fortifications



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

lunette



crossfire

Command Structure



Signalling Times : The wide variety of terrains and signalling methods make it hard to be definite about timings in any given situation, but as a rough guide allow the following:-

From	To	Time
Strategic Information Agencies	Army Commander	24 Hours
Scouts/Spies	Army Commander	72 Hours
Central Government	Army Commander	24 Hours
Outlying Cavalry	Army Commander	12 Hours
Infantry Pickets	Army Commander	6 Hours
Wig Wags/Couriers within army	Army Commander	1 Hour
Army Commander	Corps Commander	1 Hour
Corps HQ	Division HQ	30 Minute
Division HQ	Brigade HQ	20 Minute
Brigade HQ	Regimental HQ	15 Minute
Regimental HQ	Company Commander	5 Minute
Company Commander	Enlisted Man	1 Minute



So you want to be a General?



The Importance of Logistics

“Amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics.”





You may only defend or attack this country along the lines you see. Which points must you defend or capture to win a war?



There are roughly 9,500 miles of RR in the Confederacy.







SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES, 1861
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Principal Campaigns of the War
(Schematic)
ELEVATION IN FEET
SCALE OF MILES
GETTYSBURG (1863)
ANTIETAM (1862)
1st BULL RUN (1861)
2d BULL RUN (1862)
JACKSON'S VALLEY (1862)
FREDERICKSBURG (1862)
CHANCELLORSVILLE (1863)
SPOTSYLVANIA (1864)
PETERSBURG (1864-65)
PENINSULAR (1862)
GRANT'S PURSUIT OF LEE (1865)
PERRYVILLE (1862)
HENRY AND DONELSON (1862)
STONES RIVER (1862-63)
BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY
CHATTANOOGA (1863)
CHICKAMAUGA (1863)
ATLANTA (1864)
FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE (1864)
VICKSBURG (1862-63)
SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA (1864)
SHERMAN'S PURSUIT OF JOHNSTON (1865)
NAVAL BLOCKADE OF PRINCIPAL SOUTHERN PORTS
BANKS (1864)
BANKS (1863)
FARRAGUT (1862)
FARRAGUT (1864)
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
MISSOURI
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
ARKANSAS
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
LOUISIANA
FLORIDA
SOUTH CAROLINA
NORTH CAROLINA
VIRGINIA
WEST VIRGINIA (1863)
NEW JERSEY
St. Joseph
Quincy
Hannibal
Springfield
Indianapolis
Columbus
Wheeling
Gettysburg
Baltimore
Washington
Alexandria
Kansas City
Terre Haute
Alton
St. Louis
Jefferson City
Cincinnati
Charleston
Beverly
Winchester
Front Royal
Cross Keys
Frankfort
Louisville
Lexington
Evansville
Cairo
Paducah
Columbus
New Madrid
Island No. 10
Bowling Green
Ft. Donelson
Nashville
Knoxville
Lynchburg
Richmond
Norfolk
Danville
Greensboro
Raleigh
Goldsboro
Bentonville
Averysboro
Fayetteville
Wilmington
Ft. Fisher
CAPE HATTERAS
Ft. Smith
Ft. Pillow
Humboldt
Jackson
Memphis
Helena
Florence
Decatur
Ft. Hindman
Grenada
Greenville
Columbia
Augusta
Rome
La Grange
Macon
Charleston
Savannah
Shreveport
Monroe
Jackson
Meridian
Selma
Montgomery
Columbus
Natchez
Port Hudson
Baton Rouge
Pensacola
Jacksonville

The Theoretical Arithmetic of Logistics

requires 3 pounds of food per day (not incl. water).

The daily individual ration for a Union soldier consisted of:

20 ounces of fresh or salt beef or 12 ounces of pork or bacon
1 pound of hard bread or 18 ounces of flour or 20 of cornmeal.

In addition to the daily individual ration, the following were issued to every 100 men:

15 pounds of beans or peas
10 pounds of rice or hominy
10 pounds of green coffee or 1.5 pounds of tea
15 pounds of sugar
4 quarts of vinegar
3.75 pounds of salt
4 ounces of pepper
30 pounds of potatoes
when practicable, 1 quart of molasses.

This is around 3,000 calories.

The containers of the period weigh roughly as much as the food. (usually boxes)

So the average soldier needed to have 6 pounds moved to him everyday.

This adds up quickly. (40,000 men = 240,000 pounds daily)

All this was transported to the troops in wagons, which are pulled by horses or mules. Horses also pulled cannon and served as mounts for cavalry and officers.

Each horse required 20 pounds of grain and fodder every day.

Example—A standard Union artillery battery of 6 guns had 180 horses requiring 3,600 pounds per day.

Little wonder that horses were referred to as "hay-burners."

There were two basic military wagons at the time:

—4+1 spare team usually carried around 1,400 pounds

—6+1 spare team usually carried around 2,000 pounds

Example: supplying 40,000 men required 134 7-animal wagons

—feeding 40,000 men, 934 horses, and 134 teamsters required about 260,000 pounds daily. This applies only if the round trip from the supply depot can be made in two days.



The reality of the supply situation is that no army could <u>move more than 60 miles</u> from a supply depot that was supplied by either rail or water.

Why?

Example: —7 horse team + 1 teamster = 146 pounds per day in food ("fuel")

—wagon usually carries 2,000 pounds

—day 1 free, but costs 146 pounds in "fuel" every day thereafter

—covered an average of 15 miles a day (25 perfect, 5-7 terrible)



This makes for some interesting arithmetic.

—our wagon could travel about 210 miles before it ran out of fuel (14 days)

—to supply 240,000 pounds to a 40,000 man army 60 miles away from a supply depot under average conditions would require a total of 1960 wagons, 13,720 horses, and 1960 teamsters.

—245 wagons a day delivering 978 pounds of food (an 8-day round trip)

Few roads of the period could stand up to this kind of traffic.



What is an alternative?

—spread out and live off the land

—the problem with this is it makes you vulnerable to attack

Thus railroads and navigable rivers are the key to understanding how Civil War commanders thought about strategy. Only they can meet the supply demands of large numbers of troops.



The commander who ignored them did so at his and his army's peril!

Water and RR supply allowed your army to look like this …





rather than this!

As far as a logistician is concerned the advantages of RR's are legion.

Can you think of any?



Advantages:

1. Capacity

A Civil War-era railcar could carry as much as 15 tons. One 10-car train could carry as many supplies as 150 wagons.

2. Speed

A train traveled 5 times faster than a wagon train, which meant more round trips and that fewer resources needed to be devoted to supply services.

3. Dependability

Anyone who has ever dealt with mules will tell you they have a mind of their own. Enough said!

4. Availability

More rolling stock and locomotives could be produced on demand and in different models. This doesn't apply to mules/horses!

As good as RR's were for supply, knowledgeable commanders, especially Union ones, preferred supply lines based on water transport.

Can you think of two reasons why?

1. security

"We are much obliged to the Tennessee [River] which has favored us most opportunely, for I am never easy with a railroad which takes a whole army to guard, each foot of rail is essential to the whole; whereas, they can't stop the Tennessee … ."

General William Tecumseh Sherman, "Sinews of War"

2. capacity

An ordinary Ohio River steamboat of 500 tons carried enough supplies to supply an army of 40,000 men and 18,000 horses for nearly two days. This was the equivalent of five 10-car freight trains.